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“Appellate Body Held Hostage”: Is Judicial Activism at Fair Trial?  
 
Amrita Bahri* 
Abstract  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS) is in peril. The 
Appellate Body (AB) is being held as a ‘hostage’ by the very architect and the most frequent 
user of WTO DSS, the United States of America. This will bring the whole DSS to a standstill 
as the inability of AB to review the appeals will have a kill-off effect on the binding value of 
Panel rulings. If the most celebrated DSS collapses, the members would not be able to 
enforce their WTO rights. The WTO-inconsistent practices and violations would increase and 
remain unchallenged. The rights without remedies would soon lose their charm, and we 
might witness a higher and faster drift away from multilateral trade regulation. This is a 
grave situation. This piece is an academic attempt to analyse and diffuse the key points of 
criticism against AB. A comprehensive assessment of reasons behind this criticism could be a 
starting point to resolve this gridlock. The first part of this Article investigates the reasons 
and motivations of the US behind these actions as we cannot address the problems without 
understanding them in a comprehensive manner. The second part looks at this issue from a 
systemic angle as it seeks to address the debate on whether WTO resembles common or civil 
law, as most of the criticism directed towards judicial activism and overreach is “much ado 
about nothing”. The concluding part of this piece briefly looks at the proposals already made 
by scholars to resolve this deadlock, and it leaves the readers with a fresh proposal to 
deliberate upon.  
 
Keywords: Appellate Body, World Trade Organization, United States of America, Dispute 
Settlement, Common Law, Judicial Activism  
 
1. Introduction  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is seen as 
the central pillar of the multilateral trading system. Trade disputes are filed by member 
governments if they have reasons to believe that another member government is violating a 
WTO agreement or a commitment it has undertaken as part of the WTO. If member countries 
fail to arrive at a mutually acceptable decision through consultations, they can bring a formal 
case before an ad hoc Panel whose decisions are binding unless they are appealed for.1 The 
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Panel process is subject to review by a standing Appellate Body (AB) which consists of 
seven adjudicators (referred to as ‘members’).2 The AB lies at the apex of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. AB decisions are final and binding. Each AB Report is adopted unless the 
DSB decides otherwise by consensus.3 This provides finality and predictability to the dispute 
settlement process. The AB members are appointed by consensus of all WTO members 
through the DSB. Like the common law system for first time appeals, AB’s review 
jurisdiction is limited to the issues of law invoked in the Panel Report under review.4 The 
members are appointed for a term of four years, with a possibility to be reappointed for 
another term. Every appeal must be heard by three members.5 Designed preliminarily as a 
safety valve to review Panel decisions, the AB has been used in majority of cases litigated at 
WTO DSU. Between 1995 and 2014, around 66 percent of cases were appealed. In 2016 
alone, nearly 90 percent of Panel decisions were appealed.6 This has allowed AB to create 
robust international trade law jurisprudence. This widely utilised and fundamental institution 
is now in peril. The AB is being held as a “hostage” by the very architect and the most 
frequent user of WTO DSS, the United States of America (US).7 
In the past few years, the US has blocked appointments and reappointments of AB members. 
Obama administration blocked the reappointment of Jennifer Hillman in 2011 supposedly for 
failing to defend the US interests and perspectives.8 This was repeated in 2016 when it 
blocked the reappointment of Seung Wha Chang from South Korea on the grounds of his 
judicial activism and overreaching decision-making approach.9 In 2014, it blocked consensus 
for the appointment of James Gathii who would have been the first and the only black sub-
Saharan African member of AB.10 In August 2018, the US announced its plans to block the 
reappointment of the AB member from Mauritius, Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing.11 In 
addition to this, the US has continued to weaken the AB by blocking appointment of new 
successors to fill in the vacancies.12 If this attack is not put to rest, the AB will soon be 
paralysed as it would not have enough members that are required to review Panel decisions. 
This will bring the whole DSS to a standstill as the inability of AB to review the appeals will 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
1 Art. 17.1, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) 
[hereinafter DSU] 
2 DSU, art 8 
3 DSU, art 17.4  
4 DSU, art 17.6 
5 DSU, art 17.1 
6 WTO Appellate Body Reports, <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_reports_e.htm> accessed 25 
August 2018 
7 Of the 176 Rulings that were appealed between 1996 and 2017, 85 involved the US. It is the most frequent 
complainant and respondent at WTO DSU. (Source: WTO Disputes Database 2018)  
8 Appellate Body Annual Report for 2011 (June 2012, WT/AB/18), 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_an_rep_e.htm> accessed 21 August 2018 
9 ‘Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’ (May 23, 2016), 
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/us_statment_dsbmay16_e.pdf> accessed 13 August 2018 
10 Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig, Sergio Puig, ‘The Extensive (Yet Fragile) Authority of WTO Appellate 
Body’, Law & Contemporary Problems 79 (2016) 237, at 271 
11 ‘Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’ (August 27, 2018) 37, 
<https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Aug27.DSB_.Stmt_.as-delivered.fin_.public.pdf> 
accessed 28 August 2018 
12 Ibid, 36 
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have a kill-off effect on the binding value of Panel rulings. This is because the parties will 
lose their rights to get the questionable Panel rulings reviewed. Moreover, with a 
dysfunctional AB, a member facing an unfavourable Panel ruling would in practice be able to 
block its adoption by simply filing an appeal. This seems to be a race back to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 era where any member could block the 
adoption of Panel rulings (as it happened in almost half of the cases filed in the GATT 1947 
era).  
We are facing a grave situation. If the most celebrated DSM collapses, the members would 
not be able to enforce their WTO rights. The WTO-inconsistent practices and violations 
would increase and go unchallenged. WTO rights without remedies would soon lose their 
charm. The aggrieved countries would not have an enforceable right under WTO rules. We 
might witness a higher and faster drift away from multilateral trade regulation. Demise of this 
well-designed rule-based mechanism might take us back to the era of power-based free-for-
all trading system where big trade players could once again dictate the terms and conditions 
of trade. Why is US ignoring such grave repercussions and launching an attack on WTO 
DSM? Can AB’s collapse still be averted? The Article addresses and answers these questions 
in the following sections. Section 2 provides a comprehensive analysis of the underlying 
reasons behind the US actions to block the appointment or reappointment of AB members. 
Section 3 attempts to analyse the legal tradition of the WTO framework and addresses 
concerns pertaining to AB’s judicial activism and overreach. Section 4 proposes a way to 
resolve this deadlock by rethinking the selection process of AB members, carving out a way 
to provoke new discussions and deliberations on this issue.  
2. Why is US doing this? The Explicit and Implicit Reasons  
 
The frustrations of the US against WTO DSM in general and AB in particular have 
accumulated overtime for multiple reasons. The US has not provided a definitive list of 
problems it has with the AB; however, it has raised some questions and criticism from time-
to-time. The US has raised some of these concerns at Ministerial Conferences and Committee 
Meetings; however, their concerns have remained largely intact due to consensus requirement 
for any amendments or modifications to take place in DSM rules and procedures.13 It is 
possible to classify reasons and motivations behind the US actions under four categories. 
Some of these reasons are explicitly stated by US in one way or the other whilst others are 
more implicit and an attempt to read in between the lines. 
 
2.1 Procedural Matters Arising from AB Working Procedures  
 
The issues relating to the procedures of AB are of a technical nature.14 Rule 15 of the AB 
Working Procedures seems to be a major US concern.15 It is an internal rule that allows an 
                                                           
13 Art X.8, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] 
14 There are multiple procedural concerns expressed by the US, but this article will only discuss the most 
significant ones.  
15 Discussions with a former AB member [details withheld] 
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AB member (whose term has expired) to complete his/her ongoing works on an appeal at 
hand with the approval of AB and upon its notification to DSB. Since Rule 15 has been 
adopted as a Working Procedure by AB without approval from DSB, the US has argued that 
it encroaches upon the rights of member countries to appoint or reappoint the AB member in 
question.16 As a result of this rule, several AB members have worked on and decided appeals 
after the expiry of their tenures. While the US has a reasonable ground to criticise this 
provision, we cannot deny that the rule has certain benefits. It saves time that would 
otherwise be required to replace the retiring member and acquaint the new member with the 
ongoing case. Its absence will make the appellate review process even more burdensome, 
resource-demanding and time-consuming.  
In August 2017, Hyun Chong Kim resigned from his AB membership without providing the 
ninety days’ notice as required under Rule 14(2) of the AB Working Procedures. No adverse 
consequences followed this erroneous manner of resignation. The criticism of US on this 
issue is justified, as due process of leaving the body must be followed by AB members. This 
instance of erroneous practice of resignation can set a bad precedent for future AB members, 
hence it is important to raise this point and make it heard. The US is also concerned with the 
implicit tradition of ‘quasi-automatic reappointment’ of an AB member for the second term.17 
The issue of ‘quasi-automatic reappointment’ is not just a procedural concern. Article 17.2 of 
DSU Agreement states that the ‘DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body 
for a four-year term, and each person may be reappointed once’.18 The provision shows a 
premeditated agreement amongst the membership to restrict the tenure of AB members to 
four-years with the option of serving a second term for another four years. It is possible to 
construe this provision as members’ attempt to maintain their authority over WTO’s 
adjudicatory wing. AB is not a constitutional supreme court; it is a judicial institution created 
as a result of an agreement between members. Hence, the four years tenure with a possibility 
for extension could be seen as an attempt by members to create a mechanism of “checks and 
balances” which can allow them to review the performance of AB members in the previous 
term, and based on their performance review, decide on the issue of their reappointment for a 
second term. This observation shows that the purpose of this mechanism is being impaired by 
the growing tradition of ‘quasi-automatic reappointment’. This point of criticism should 
therefore not be reduced to a mere procedural concern. It is important that members realise 
the broader purpose of this provision and become more engaged with the performance review 
considerations at the stage of reappointment.  
                                                           
16 ‘Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’ (August 31, 2017), 
<https://geneva.usmission.gov/2017/08/31/statements-by-the-united-states-at-the-august-31-2017-dsb-meeting/> 
accessed 25 August 2018 
17 Tatyana Payosova, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, ‘The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World 
Trade Organization: Causes and Cures’, Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief (March 
2018), <https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb18-5.pdf> accessed 2 July 2018  
18 DSU, art 17.2 
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Yet another concern is the increase in the duration of appeal proceedings.19 While the given 
time limit for appeal process is 60 days or 90 days for complex appeals, this limit has lately 
been more of an exception than a rule as it has scantly been observed.20 Currently, an appeal 
on an average is concluded in around one year.21 The US has asserted that the AB members 
should comply with the time limit agreed by the members. However, it is important to be 
realistic. In the words of a former AB member, ‘the growing complexity of WTO disputes, 
the high rate of appeal of panel reports and the number of issues appealed, the amount of 
jurisprudence, the size of submissions, among other things…’ makes the 90-day rule an 
unrealistic deadline.22 These reasons justify a revision of the 90-day deadline. If membership 
wants to stick to this deadline, efforts should be made to amend the size of submissions made 
by parties, or introduce a process of summary judgments.23  
2.2 The Conceptualisation Matters: Is Appellate Body Really Required?  
 
Trade law community feels that the problems US has with AB may go beyond the procedural 
issues that have been in discussions lately. Unlike a court that derives its mandate from a 
constitution, the AB is a standing body for appellate review of Panel rulings and is 
constituted by way of an agreement between member countries and hence its manner of 
working and procedures should also be determined by member countries. However, as we 
have seen above, this has not been the case. This observation resonates with the US concerns 
and highlights the need to create a mechanism which allows member countries to review the 
performance of AB members on a regular basis. There may also be a question as to whether it 
is an efficient layer of adjudication and if it is required for the settlement of disputes between 
member countries.24 Are Panel rulings not sufficient to enforce WTO rights? Has this second 
layer of justice caused undue delays in the dispensation of justice in international trade 
disputes? Off course the AB is not infallible and it has multiple problems, but the fact that it 
has been used so widely and frequently by member countries testifies that it is indeed an 
indispensable layer of justice which is required to review questionable Panel decisions.  
 
The US perception seems to indicate that AB has broken the multilaterally negotiated bargain 
between member countries by exercising judicial activism and overreach. The US for the 
very first time has bound itself to the binding and compulsory jurisdiction of an international 
court. It has never done that before. The traditional international adjudicatory institutions 
have functioned without compulsory jurisdiction. The WTO DSM is a completely different 
mechanism. Unlike the GATT-era, the rulings are almost automatically accepted unless all 
                                                           
19 Based on author’s observation findings at G2 Conference on Resolving Disputes in International Economic 
Law (Georgetown’s Institute of International Economic Law, 11 July 2018) and Society of International 
Economic Law Conference (12-14 July 2018, American University Washington College of Law)  
20 DSU, art 17.5  
21 For example, in United States — Conditional Tax Incentives for Large Civil Aircraft DS487, the United 
States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal on 16 December 2016. The Appellate Body report was 
circulated to Members on 4 September 2017. 
22 Proposals outlined in Farewell speech of Appellate Body Member Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández, 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ricardoramirezfarwellspeech_e.htm> accessed 21 August 2018.   
23 Ibid  
24 Discussions with a former AB member [Details withheld]  
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member countries (including the winning member country) block its adoption. The Trump 
Administration has recently suggested that the ‘Trump administration may wish to deploy the 
Appellate Body crisis to force a return to a more politicised dispute settlement system’.25 So, 
could this be seen as an attempt to go back to the power-based GATT-era where the US could 
unilaterally block the adoption of a decision as and when it pleases? Before time answers this 
question, we need to take immediate steps to impede this potential regression.  
 
2.3 Systemic Issues Bothering the US: Making Implicit Explicit   
 
This unprecedented situation calls for an in-depth assessment of the reasons underlying this 
situation. It is imperative to look beyond the more apparent reasons and provoke discussions 
on possible implicit reasons that may lie beneath the root of this crisis. These developments 
could be interpreted as a disguised attempt by the US to paralyse the multilateral trading 
system. Recent developments in Trans-Pacific Partnership, Korea-US FTA and NAFTA 
show the US frustration with trade agreements. Moreover, President Trump has threatened to 
withdraw from the WTO.26 In the words of President Trump, the WTO ‘was set up for the 
benefit of everybody but [the United States]… It was set up for the benefit of taking 
advantage of the United States.’27 As President Trump cannot withdraw from the WTO 
without congressional approval, the interventions to block the appointment of AB members 
may as well be a disguised attempt to drown the whole WTO system by paralysing its 
adjudicatory institutions.28 However, such an interpretation of the US actions is contradictory 
to its practice. It has long taken advantage of the WTO system. It is indeed the most frequent 
user of WTO DSM both as a complainant and a respondent. ‘The United States has won 
85.7% of the cases it has initiated before the WTO since 1995, compared with a global 
average of 84.4%. In contrast, China’s success rate is just 66.7%.’29 The recent complaints 
filed by the US at WTO DSU shows to a large extent that it still believes in the multilateral 
trading system and has underlying interests in its continuance.30 Then why would US, the 
most frequent user of DSU, want to amend the present modus operandi of the system? Do we 
need to “read something in between the lines” here?  
 
                                                           
25 Gerhard Erasmus, ‘The Appellate Body Crisis’, (Tralac, 15 December 2017) 
<https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/12560-the-appellate-body-crisis.html> accessed 3 August 2018 
26 Gregory Corte, ‘Trump escalates his threats to blow up trade deals: 'I would withdraw from the WTO' (USA 
Today, 30 August 2018), <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/30/wto-trump-threatens-pull-
out-world-trade-organization/1149421002/> accessed 30 August 2018  
27 Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig and Mark Pollack ‘The Slow Killing of the World Trade Organization’ 
(Huffington Post, 17 November 2017), <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-slow-killing-of-the-world-
trade-organization_us_5a0ccd1de4b03fe7403f82df> accessed 21 August 2018 
28 Section 125(b), Uruguay Round Agreements Act 1994 provides that the President requires a joint resolution 
of the two houses of congress. [Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), 19 
U.S.C. 3501 ] 
29 2018 Economic Report of the President, at 251, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/ERP_2018_Final-
FINAL.pdf?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=sendto_newslettertest&stream=to> 
accessed 21 August 2018 
30 The US has filed 12 complaints since January 2017. World Trade Organization: Disputes by Members, 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> accessed 20 August 2018 
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It is possible to construe that the US actions and statements against WTO DSM could be its 
way of telling other member countries that it is now time to pay serious attention to the US 
concerns regarding WTO DSM and initiate multilateral negotiations leading to its review and 
revisions. If this interpretation is to be believed, the actions have indeed proven effective as 
they have brought to forefront the need to review and update the multilateral trading rules. Its 
anti-liberalisation actions may also be an endeavour to bring China to the negotiating table 
and diffuse its demand for gaining market economy status in trade remedies investigations. 
There is an ongoing dispute at WTO on this issue between China and the EU and the US.31 
China claims that with the expiry of Section 15(a)(ii) of China’s Protocol of Accession, the 
WTO members should revert to the application of normal methodology against Chinese 
imports.32 China is a staunch user of WTO DSM, and hence these actions could be seen as an 
attempt by US to force China to give up on its demand to gain market economy status under 
the shadow of a threat, i.e., the threat being that the US can destroy the WTO’s litigation 
wing if its concerns are not sufficiently addressed. 
 
This move against AB is challenging the independence and impartiality of WTO’s litigation 
wing. Thanks to the US actions, the existence of DSM is under grave threat. If the US 
continues to block the appointment of AB members, the downfall of AB will amount to the 
downfall of the whole DSM. Trump administration surely understands this repercussion. 
Hence, its actions could be seen as an attempt to pressurise the adjudicators to deliver 
favourable decisions under the shadow of an imminent threat. The recent statements made by 
Mr Lighthizer strengthen this construction as he warns that the US would have to consider 
undertaking an action if the WTO finds in China’s favour in the recent dispute pending 
between the US and China over the market economy status of China.33 
This strategy could also be seen as President Trump’s way to negotiate under the “shadow of 
threat” to withdraw. This is not the first instance where President Trump’s administration is 
seen using this negotiating strategy. A recent example that illustrates this point is the manner 
in which the preliminarily revised text of NAFTA was renegotiated between the US and 
Mexico after a year-long renegotiation process.34 In his first 100 days at office, President 
Trump clearly stated that the US would withdraw from NAFTA if it is not revised and 
renegotiated in light of its objectives and expectations.35 In the recently announced 
preliminary agreement on the revision of NAFTA, there are two clear victories for the US. 
                                                           
31 Request for Consultation from China, United States-Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS515/R (Dec. 12, 2016) 
32 For more details, see Amrita Bahri ‘Treatment of Non Market Economies in Anti-Dumping Proceedings: The 
Mexican Approach’, in James Nedumpara & Weihuan Zhou (ed.) Non-Market Economies in the Global Trading 
System: The Case of China (Springer, 2018) 259  
33 See n 31. Shawn Donnan, ‘WTO chief warns of risks to trade peace’ (Financial Times, 2 October 2017) 
<http://globaltraderelations.net/images/Article.WTO_and_New_Judges_FT_10.2.17_.pdf> accessed 1 August 
2018 
34 White House, Economy & Jobs Press Release, ‘President Donald J. Trump Is Keeping His Promise to 
Renegotiate NAFTA’ (27 August 2018), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-
trump-keeping-promise-renegotiate-nafta/> accessed 5 September 2018  
35 The objections and expectations of the US from NAFTA renegotiations are stated in ‘Summary of Objectives 
for NAFTA Renegotiation’, United States Trade Representative (17 July 2017), 
<https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf> accessed 4 September 2018  
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First, a new ‘labour value content’ rule fixes a minimum income threshold and requires that 
40-45 percent of auto content shall be made by workers earning at least $16 per hour. Once 
enforced, this could significantly move the production of automobile from Mexico to higher 
wage rate zones such as the US.36 Second, increase in the regional value content requirement 
encourages United States manufacturing and regional economic growth by requiring that 75 
percent of auto content be made in the United States and Mexico.37 
Currently, Mexican steel and aluminium is subject to a 25 percent duty in the US.38 Mexico 
has retaliated by imposing duties against certain exports from the United States.39 Mexico has 
also challenged these duties at WTO DSU.40 These actions clearly show Mexico’s frustration 
against these duties; however, it has chosen to ignore this issue in bilateral NAFTA 
renegotiations with the US. Perhaps the imposition of tariffs on Mexico and Canada amidst 
the rounds of renegotiation could also be seen as a pressure exerting strategy which put the 
US in the driving seat during NAFTA renegotiations. This example shows how the US has 
augmented its ability to secure better terms of trade through its threats to withdraw from 
NAFTA altogether and imposition of tariffs on strategic industries. Perhaps, the US is trying 
to use a similar negotiating strategy with WTO members for gaining an upper-hand during 
negotiations over WTO DSU. It seems that it is trying to give a near-death experience to AB 
members and it will release the grip just before the AB actually dies. 
2.4 Controversial Common Law Trends and Judicial Activism 
 
The US has challenged AB’s defiance to the spirit and letter of the grand bargain leading to 
Marrakesh Agreements. It has questioned the decision-making approach of AB members and 
has accused them of transgressing their mandate of interpreting legal rules. It is alleged that 
“judicial activism”41 displayed by AB amounts to the creation of new rights and obligations 
without gaining consensus of all WTO members.42 Hence, the controversial “common law 
trends” employed by AB members in reviewing Panel decisions can be seen as an 
encroachment over the legislative powers of WTO members. There are several examples that 
illustrate how AB members have employed common law trends in decision-making. These 
                                                           
36 Office of the United States Trade Representative Press Release, ‘UNITED STATES–MEXICO TRADE 
FACT SHEET Rebalancing Trade to Support Manufacturing’ (August 2018), at <https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2018/august/united-states%E2%80%93mexico-trade-fact-sheet> 
accessed 5 September 2018 
37 Ibid.  
38 White House Press Release, ‘Presidential Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States’ 
(8 March 2018), at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-adjusting-
imports-steel-united-states/> accessed 6 September 2018 
39 Secretaria De Economía (Mexico), Diario Oficial De La Federación, ‘Decreto Por El Que Se Modifica La 
Tarifa De La Ley De Los Impuestos Generales De Importación Y De Exportación (5 June 2018) 
40 United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products (WT/DS551/1, Request for consultations, 
5 June 2018) 
41 In this article, the expression “judicial expression” is used to refer to two of its form. The first form is judicial 
legislation, which refers to the act of judges making laws and ‘legislating from the bench’. The second form is 
judiciary’s departure from accepted rules of interpretation. [Keenan D. Kmiec, ‘The origins and Current 
Meanings of Judicial Activism’, California Law Review 92(5) (2004) 1442, at 1471, 1473]  
42 ‘Statement by the United States’, n 9 
9 
 
trends can broadly be classified into three types: (i) decisions creating rules, (ii) decisions 
creating persuasive precedents, (iii) decisions creating obiter dicta. 
 
2.4.1 Decisions creating rules  
 
The AB has allegedly created new rights and obligations of WTO members through its 
interpretation of WTO agreements. The US-China dispute over state-owned enterprises in 
2011 neatly illustrates this point.43 This dispute pertains to the definition of the term ‘public 
bodies’. The SCM Agreement deems a "subsidy" to exist where "a government or any public 
body" offers a financial contribution that provides a benefit to the recipient.44 The Agreement 
fails to define the term "public body", and AB’s attempt to fill this gap has emerged as a 
major point of disappointment for the US. The US in this case offered a broad interpretation 
of this provision arguing that public bodies are entities that are majority owned and controlled 
by the Chinese government.45 China on the other hand proposed a narrower definition as it 
claimed that public bodies should resemble an ‘entity that exercises authority vested in it by 
the government for the purpose of performing functions of a government character’.46 The 
AB in this case accepted the Chinese interpretation and ruled that enterprises cannot be 
considered “public bodies” merely on the grounds of being majority-owned and controlled by 
government.47 This implies that to base a claim on SCM agreement against a state-owned 
enterprise, a complainant will have to demonstrate (and prove with sufficient evidence) that 
the enterprise in question is invested with government authority or performs a government 
function. In the words of a trade lawyer, ‘the test is set up in such a way that no enterprise 
providing goods or services will pass it. In this way, it completely writes off the concept of 
“public body” from the SCM Agreement.’48 
The dispute between China and US in 2014 once again brought to forefront the long-standing 
debate over the meaning of “public body”.49 Recalling the AB ruling in 2011, the Panel in 
this case ruled that a government’s part ownership or control over an entity is not sufficient to 
establish that it is indeed a public body for the purposes of Article 1 of SCM Agreement and 
the key consideration in this determination should be whether the entity in question performs 
a government function or is vested with government authority.50 This interpretation 
drastically narrows down the scope of SCM agreement as it implies that anti-subsidy 
measures can only be imposed on entities that either perform government functions or are 
vested with government authority. In doing so, AB has not specified the type of evidence that 
a complainant must furnish, and for this reason, US asserts that the AB has failed to provide a 
clear and practical guidance for the application of WTO rules. The US also asserts that the 
                                                           
43 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011 
44 Article 1.1 of SCM Agreement defines subsidy as ‘a financial contribution by a government or any public 
body’. [Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A] 
45 US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, n 43, para 129 
46 Ibid, para 305  
47 Ibid, para 611 
48 Interview with a trade lawyer [Details withheld] 
49 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/R, adopted 16 January 2015 
50 Ibid, para 4.32, page 71 
10 
 
narrow definition of “public body” discourages future complainants to bring a claim under 
SCM Agreement as it excludes many types of enterprises which are state owned or state 
controlled. It also argues that these rulings can have a counterproductive effect of 
encouraging countries (such as China) ‘to act opaquely by concealing the control they 
exercise over companies, since the burden of proof lies with the complaining 
administration’.51 
 
This case is thus a classic example of how AB has affected the rights of complainants in 
filing trade remedy claims against countries with non-market tendencies. It represents how 
AB has expanded its judicial authority into the realm of law-making. It is quite paradoxical to 
notice that the US in this case did not shy away from proposing a common law like broad 
interpretation of the term whilst it has from time-to-time denounced AB’s display of judicial 
activism. The US has repeatedly stated that any attempt by AB to fill gaps in the WTO 
agreements amounts to a violation of Article 3.2 of DSU Agreement that confers the 
‘exclusive authority to adopt interpretations’ of Multilateral Trade Agreements to the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council.  
 
2.4.2 Decisions creating persuasive precedents 
 
The concept of precedents is widely understood as a distinguishing characteristic of common 
law tradition. A precedent is a previous case that sets an example or guides the settlement of 
future disputes with similar facts and legal issues. A precedent could be binding or persuasive 
in nature. The WTO jurisprudence has shown that AB findings are more or less considered as 
precedents with a persuasive effect. For example, in the case of US-Shrimp, AB confirmed 
that the Panel ‘was right to use’ and ‘rely on’ the reasoning of AB report and in fact 
encouraged the Panel to use AB ‘findings as a tool for its own reasoning’.52 Moreover, AB 
explicitly stated that the reasoning provided in its findings should be relied upon by all 
‘future panels’.53 
 
In US-Stainless Steel (Mexico), it was seen that AB was ‘deeply concerned about the Panel’s 
decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the 
interpretation of the same legal issues’54 and hence it chose to reconfirm the precedential 
effect of its rulings for future Panel decisions. AB explicitly stated that its interpretations of 
the covered agreements should generally be followed by Panels especially where they are 
dealing with similar issues.55 AB clarified that its reports have a binding force with respect to 
resolving the particular case at hand and thus are not binding on other cases that may arise in 
                                                           
51 Elvire Fabry and Erik Tate, ‘Saving the Appellate Body or Returning to the Wild West of Trade?’ Europe: A 
Values-Based Power (Policy paper 225, 7 July 2018) at 11, at <http://institutdelors.eu/publications/sauver-
lorgane-dappel-de-lomc-ou-revenir-au-far-west-commercial/?lang=en> accessed 25 July 2018 
52 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, at 107, 109. [Presently derived from Henry Gao, ’Dictum on 
Dicta, Obiter Dicta in WTO Disputes’ 2018 World Trade Review 17(3), at 509] 
53 Ibid, at 107.  
54 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
WT/DS344/AB/R, 20 May 2008, at 162 
55 Ibid, 160-161 
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the future; at the same time, it noted that the Panels should not ignore legal interpretations 
and legal reasoning provided in adopted Appellate Body reports for the sake of maintaining 
security and predictability in WTO dispute settlement system.56 The Appellate Body 
concluded in this case that ‘absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same 
legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.’57 The term ‘absent cogent reasons’ 
clarifies that Panels can employ a different course of reasoning for the previously decided 
legal questions by AB if they have clear and convincing reasons to do so. In US — 
Countervailing Measures (China) case, the AB enumerated a number of reasons where Panel 
can deviate from AB interpretations: (i) when a new multilateral interpretation of the relevant 
agreement exists, (ii) the previous interpretation has been demonstrated to be unworkable, 
(iii) it is in conflict with another agreement, or (iv) it is based on a factually incorrect 
premise.58 However, beyond these factors, the AB has not defined the term ‘cogent’, leaving 
some discretion to interpret this expression in the hands of Panellists. Moreover, it is 
important to note that none of the AB rulings so far have stated that its rulings should be 
treated as binding precedents for resolving future disputes. Hence, the system of precedents 
does exist in WTO legal system, yet these precedents are not binding but persuasive in 
nature.  
 
2.4.3 Decisions creating obiter dicta  
 
The concept of obiter dicta is a unique phenomenon of decision-making in common law 
jurisdictions. An obiter dicta is considered to be ‘an expression of opinion in regard to some 
point or rule of law, made by a judge in the course of a judicial opinion, but not necessary to 
the determination of the case before the court’.59 Law students in common law jurisdictions 
spend a considerable period of time learning the distinction between the ratio decidendi 
(which forms part of the decision and has a binding force) and obiter dicta (which does not 
form part of the decision and are things said in passing). This typology is used in common 
law world to draw distinction between those parts of a judgment that form key holding and 
the ones that are related but are not essential to the holding. Obiter dicta, though not having a 
precedential value, can be employed by parties as persuasive arguments for future courts 
deciding similar issues.60 
 
The US has alleged that AB has often issued opinions on matters that are not raised by the 
parties. Several reports indicate that AB has recognised that obiter dicta are relevant but not 
essential to a holding.61 These opinions are issued in the form of dicta that are not essential 
for the settlement of dispute at hand. The very first case where AB employed the term obiter 
dicta is Canada-Periodicals wherein the AB recognised certain parts of the Panel report as 
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obiter dicta.62 In the case of Argentina-Financial Services, the AB report was staunchly 
criticised by the US as it discussed moot concepts in great detail.63 Two-third of its report 
was seen as obiter dicta.64 This amounted to 46 pages of the report.65 In the case of India – 
Agricultural Products, the US criticised AB for discussing issues that were not raised by the 
parties.66 In the words of the US, ‘[th]ese interpretations served no purpose in resolving the 
dispute – they were appeals of moot panel findings. Thus, more than two-thirds of the 
Appellate Body’s analysis is comprised simply of advisory opinions on legal issues.’67 The 
US has alleged that AB should resist from writing dicta as it is a completely unnecessary 
exercise. It goes on to state that AB is not an ‘academic body that may pursue issues simply 
because they are of interest to them or may be to certain Members in the abstract’.68 
 
Article 17.1 of DSU requires AB to address each of the issues that are raised by parties in an 
appeal; however, there is no provision in DSU agreement that restricts AB from looking at 
issues beyond the ones presented by parties to the dispute. Then why is US so averse to obiter 
dicta in WTO jurisprudence? The US has alleged that the task of additional analysis that is 
not essential to the actual settlement of dispute impedes prompt settlement of disputes.69 Its 
reasoning against the inclusion of obiter dicta in a report seems to be in conflict with its 
criticism against Rule 15 as appointment of a new member who needs a reasonable period of 
time to be fully acquaint with an ongoing appeal can also cause serious delay in the issuance 
of AB report. It also alleges that the not-so-relevant paragraphs that offer additional analysis 
can wrongly influence future settlement of disputes by Panels.70 This allegation is justified as 
Panellists or representing lawyers could view the entire report from AB as a persuasive 
precedent. This could happen especially if the Panellists or lawyers are from civil law 
jurisdictions, as legal studies and training in most civil law countries do not generally include 
training on how to draw a distinction between obiter dicta and ratio decidendi.71 The EC – 
Fasteners case illustrates this point. In this case, the legal issue before the AB was whether 
producers from China should get a country wide dumping duty or individual treatment. 
However, AB gave a detailed obiter dicta on the consequences of the expiry of Article 
15(a)(ii) of the China’s Accession Protocol on the choice of methodologies.72 The lawyers 
representing China in the ongoing NME litigation against the US and the EU have held on to 
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Add.1, adopted 9 May 2016, p. 431 
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this “finding” as their basic line of defence.73 This example illustrates the confusion 
additional analysis can cause in such litigations. However, there are several benefits of obiter 
dicta that are being overlooked by its critics. Pre-identification and pre-assessment of issues 
that may form part of future disputes can help developing countries with capacity constraints 
to prepare and argue their claims in a timely and cost-effective manner. Less ambiguity and 
more guidance on complex legal issues will help lawyers representing developing countries 
to prepare their arguments promptly, which would eventually reduce the legal cost a country 
will be required to spend on hiring legal expertise.74 This argument may not be as convincing 
for the US as it would be for a developing country user of DSM, but it shows that obiter dicta 
can play a capacity-building role for countries with insufficient legal expertise and financial 
resources.  
 
3. Common versus Civil Law Saga: ‘Much Ado about Nothing’ 
 
When it comes to the question of whether WTO legal system is a common or a civil law 
system, the responses one would receive are quite varied. WTO law scholarship is divided on 
this issue. Some scholars have argued that WTO legal system is a purely civil law system and 
any attempt to identify common law elements in it is without any legal or rational basis.75 
Other scholars have analysed the role of common law concepts such as precedents and stare 
decisis in WTO jurisprudence and have argued that the prevalence of these concepts brings 
WTO law closer to common law tradition.76 In my opinion, it is a matter of who you ask this 
question to. A common law lawyer will focus on the role precedents have played in WTO 
jurisprudence and towards clarification of ambiguities in WTO laws. In contrast, a civil law 
lawyer will demolish the argument of a common law scholar in light of its extensive 
codification in the form of WTO agreements. Perhaps it is time to ask this question to a 
scholar who comes from a mixed jurisdiction of law.  
Common and civil law in the last few decades have inter-changed their elements in various 
jurisdictions.77 Increasing amount of codification is seen in countries with common law 
traditions, whereas, several civil law countries have employed common law procedures. For 
example, much of the UK’s constitutional order is now written down in the form of statutes. 
United States Statutes at Large is another example of a predominantly common law 
jurisdiction employing the civil law approach of codification. On the other hand, Mexico, a 
civil law jurisdiction, has recently employed adversarial justice tendencies into its 
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inquisitorial judicial procedures.78 Sweden, traditionally considered as a civil law jurisdiction, 
employs jury system for certain freedom of expression matters including defamation.79 This 
shows that common and civil law features can coexist in a single legal system and both 
traditions indeed overlap and converge in multiple jurisdictions. Is there a systemic or 
conceptual problem in acknowledging this overlap and coexistence in WTO legal system? 
There is no denying of the fact that the system of codification coexists with precedential 
value of AB reports in the WTO legal system.  
The DSU Agreement provides that the system ‘serves to preserve the rights and obligations 
of Members’ and that its rulings ‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements’.80 At the same time, DSS also has the responsibility ‘to 
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’.81 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties lays down the general rule of interpretation as it states that ‘[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’82 Hence, the rules of 
construction provided in the Vienna Convention give considerable flexibility to interpret 
WTO provisions as they seek to employ a purposive rule of statutory interpretation. Hence, 
judicial activism displayed by AB members is not without a legal basis, as the tools of 
construction allow them to justify their interpretation in multiple ways.  
 
The frustration against this judicial activism starts when AB crosses the line of clarification 
and interpretation and enters the terrain of gap-filling and law-making. As lawyers, we cannot 
deny that laws can always be interpreted in more than one way and it is quite difficult to draw 
a precise line of distinction between these four tasks in practice. Interpretation of a legal 
issue often amounts to its clarification. The act of clarifying an ambiguity in a legal provision 
may sometimes lead to gap-filling, and filling a gap or a grey area can be seen by critics as 
the act of law-making. Hence, it is not always possible to draw a clean line of divide between 
the judicial act of interpretation and the legislative act of law-making as they often overlap 
and converge in practice. Perhaps AB’s attempt at interpretation and clarification, which falls 
well within its ambit, is being misconstrued by its critics as the acts of law-making and gap-
filling. 
 
The WTO Agreements are drafted with a certain level of ambiguity and hence several 
provisions of these agreements can be interpreted in different ways. ‘One cannot forget that 
the people who wrote the WTO agreements were predominantly diplomats. It is of the 
essence of diplomacy that expressions are used that cater to a large number of people so that 
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agreement can be reached. Consequently, the WTO agreements contain provisions that are 
not always the best example of lawyerly rigour and accuracy.’83 So, who is responsible to fill 
these gaps? These gaps can be filled by WTO’s legislative wing through multilateral 
negotiation, which has made a very marginal progress ever since its creation in 1995. 
Alternatively, ambiguities can be resolved by way of judicial interpretation at Panel and 
Appellate stages. There is no third option. The decision-making approach of AB should be 
comprehended in this context.  
 
There are three guiding principles of WTO dispute settlement: provide security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system, clarify existing provisions, and secure 
positive resolution to disputes. AB decisions have upheld all three principles. Even though 
AB decisions have no formal stare decisis effect, previous AB reports are regularly cited and 
referred to in panel and AB reports. For example, in the case of EC-Seal Products, AB cited 
sixty-seven panel and AB decisions to justify its interpretations of WTO legal provisions.84 
Joost Pauwelyn has found that 35.4 percent of AB decisions have cross-referenced each 
other, and the Panels have recurrently followed AB decisions with a few exceptions.85 Parties 
to the disputes have also based their arguments and counterarguments on past AB decisions 
in their written as well as oral submissions. The US is no different; it has repeatedly and 
consistently cited AB decisions in its written submissions. For example, in the case of US-
Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, the US cited nearly twenty-five AB reports 
only in its first written submission.86 It also cited a GATT Panel Report from 1994 in defence 
of its arguments on the issue of considering the recipient’s “creditworthiness” in assessing 
whether a government-provided loan confers a benefit.87 This confirms that the US has made 
extensive use of precedents to support their legal arguments not just from WTO era but also 
from the GATT era. This practice shows that the US has, together with other member 
countries, considered AB decisions as part of the WTO acquis. The vast jurisprudence 
created by AB decisions promotes predictability and security in the multilateral trading 
system. It guides future Panellists and parties through WTO disputes. It also provides 
guidance to dispute settlement forums and parties to disputes under preferential trade 
agreements.  
 
AB does not issue rulings; it only issues recommendations. These recommendations are 
subsequently adopted by all member countries by way of consensus. This stage (where 
member countries consider the adoption of AB’s recommendations) allows them the space to 
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review and if required criticise these recommendations. It is interesting to note that the 
membership has almost always welcomed these recommendations. It was only on one 
occasion in the case of US Shrimp-Turtle where the entire membership collectively – except 
the US – objected to the acceptance of unsolicited amicus curiae briefs by AB under Article 
13 of DSU Agreement.88 This shows that there is no general discontent with the working of 
AB. To the contrary, the frequency of its use shows that the membership believes in this 
institution and has found it indispensably valuable.  
 
As we are rapidly witnessing changes in international trade and commerce with new 
technological innovations such as 3-D printing of goods, smart contracts and crypto-currency, 
WTO law disciplines are at risk of becoming obsolete. They are at the risk of becoming 
obsolete if they do not regulate new ways in which foreign trade transactions are conducted. 
This risk can only be mitigated by revising and updating the current rules through multilateral 
negotiations. Since WTO’s negotiation wing has not worked well, its litigation wing appears 
to have compensated for the lack of progress in multilateral negotiations by employing 
different interpretations and hence clarifying legal complexities through dispute resolution.  
 
This jurisprudential development can sometimes have the effect of developing laws or filling 
legal gaps, but WTO members can undo these developments by adopting authoritative 
interpretations of legal provisions. AB can employ an interpretation for the sake of resolving 
a trade dispute, and WTO members can multilaterally review and if required change this 
interpretation through their right under Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement which provides 
Ministerial Conference and General Council ‘the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations’ 
of WTO agreements. This argument should not be construed as one attacking the doctrine of 
separation of powers, as the role of judiciary is certainly different from the law-making role 
played by treaty negotiators. However, international judges play a crucial role in shaping and 
defining law and policy. This is especially true in multilateral trade law regime, where 
Member-deadlock in negotiations and ambiguity in legal provisions have necessitated the 
judiciary to play a proactive role in clarifying the provisions. 
 
4. Resolving the Deadlock: Concluding Thoughts   
 
AB derives its power from WTO membership. In fact, the very existence of AB is a result of 
membership’s will. WTO is a member-driven organisation, and the members are the supreme 
most authority to decide how different organs of WTO should function in the future. WTO 
membership has created a comprehensive system to settle disputes with an appellate authority 
to ensure that WTO rights are effectively enforced. This system has emerged as the most 
successful achievement of multilateral trading system. With the passage of time, and due to 
failures in multilateral negotiations, some parts of this system may have become obsolete and 
thus need revision. However, it does not deserve to die, especially at the hands of a single 
member country.  
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In an attempt to rescue the AB, scholars have made several proposals. Steve Charnovitz has 
advanced the idea that AB members should close themselves to further appeals. This would 
have the effect of rendering panel reports to be adopted as final unless rejected by a negative 
consensus.89 Pieter Jan Kuijper proposed that the selection of members can be made by 
majority or super-majority voting in place of consensus. Kuijper also proposes that a new 
tribunal established under a newly negotiated multilateral dispute settlement treaty can 
provide for an appellate authority.90 Other proposals include using the bilateral arbitration 
mechanism (provided in Article 25 of DSU agreement) to set up a temporary appeal 
procedure.91 None of these proposals try to address the US concerns with an inclusionary 
approach. They in fact do the opposite: they can have the effect of hastening US’s 
disengagement from the multilateral trading system. This is not an ideal outcome for any 
WTO member. It is important to engage with the US and give it a fair hearing.  
 
In the words of a former AB member, ‘WTO needs the US and the US needs the WTO. It is 
essential to bring US to the negotiating table. The US so far has not put any proposal on the 
table. No matter how drastic or unacceptable, it is important to at least put a proposal on the 
table.’92 In July 2017, the European Union advanced a proposal for the appointment of the 
AB members. In this proposal, it proposed to restart the selection process of AB members to 
fill-up the vacancies, establish a selection committee for the appointment of AB members, 
and set a deadline for the members to submit their nominations for candidates, and for the 
selection committee to issue its recommendations to DSB on the appointment of AB 
members by September/October 2017.93 Several Latin American countries made a similar 
joint proposal regarding the issue.94 Subsequently, the two proposing group of members came 
together and made a joint proposal.95 This joint proposal once again mirrored the points 
raised in the initial EU proposal, with the only exception that it recommended the proposed 
Selection Committee to carry out its work without a specific deadline.  
 
The US has rejected these proposals, but it is nevertheless an admirable initiative by members 
to resolve this deadlock.96 The joint proposal made by the EU (twenty-eight member 
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countries), together with twenty-two other member countries, shows a concerted effort of 
these WTO members to address the issue of selection of AB members. This concerted effort 
shows that many member countries are committed to the continual existence of the appellate 
review process. However, the underlying issue is that none of these proposals have tried to 
address the key concerns of the US behind this move. In these proposals, they have neither 
addressed nor discussed the issue relating to Rule 15, the concern of ‘quasi-automatic 
reappointment’ process, or the issue pertaining to judicial activism. To engage the US, it is 
important to address the problems and engage in serious discussions with the US to find 
mutually acceptable solutions to the problems.  
A commendable attempt in this regard comes from the recent proposals made by the 
European Commission.97 The Commission has offered various proposals to address the US 
concerns pertaining to the 90-day deadline, judicial activism and the mandate. In this Concept 
Paper, the EU has expressed strong willingness to engage with the US in addressing its 
concerns regarding the Panel and the AB overstepping their mandate and engaging in the act 
of judicial legislation. It also proposes to increase the number of AB members from seven to 
nine. This increase would reduce the workload of each AB member and hence could allow 
the members to promptly issue their decisions. The 90-day deadline being a key concern of 
the US, the EU’s initiative to address this concern may break the deadlock we are facing 
today. The Commission has also proposed that the AB members can be appointed on a full-
time basis. This will increase their overall availability in Geneva and hence the number of 
hours they will have to work on resolving the appeals, hence mitigating the possibility for 
time delays in decision-making.  
The EU has also proposed a provision for an annual meeting of the AB with the WTO 
members to allow the latter to discuss and communicate their concerns on various systemic 
and procedural issues with the AB members on a regular basis. This channel of interaction 
between WTO members and AB members will allow them to build mutual trust and 
confidence amongst them on various issues of appellate review. This initiative could 
therefore reduce or minimise the possibilities of such a deadlock (as we are facing today) in 
the future. The Commission has also proposed to strengthen and expand the resources of the 
AB Secretariat; however, this will escalate the cost concerns of WTO members. A cost-
effective way to strengthen the AB Secretariat could be to recruit higher number of interns to 
assist AB members with research and analysis. This will increase the overall human resource 
and expertise available with the AB. This can help speed-up the decision-making process. 
Moreover, it will also contribute in awareness and capacity building as it will give young 
trade law enthusiasts the opportunity to closely observe the multilateral dispute settlement 
process. The US has already signalled that it cannot accept some of these proposals.98 
Nevertheless, this initiative is a much-desired step towards engaging the US. Unless its 
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concerns are acknowledged by other members, the US may continue to block further 
appointments. 
Perhaps, we can start by addressing the issues that can be fixed easily, such as the issue of 
Rule 15 (which the EU Commission has mentioned and dismissed in its proposal). The issue 
of Rule 15 can be addressed simply by revising the Working Procedures of AB. The 
Georgetown University has made a sound proposal on this. It proposes that the ‘carry-over 
could be limited to those cases where the oral hearing (on the merits) has occurred or started.’ 
The AB member should be replaced only in a case where the hearing has not yet been held.99 
Other challenges, especially the ones pertaining to judicial activism and its conceptualisation, 
are more difficult to address. However, the starting point to address these concerns is to 
convince the US to seriously engage in discussions. Perhaps, it will be easier to engage the 
US in discussions if initial steps are taken to address some of its concerns. Addressing and 
solving the procedural issues can send a signal from members to the US that they are now 
willing to engage in serious multilateral negotiations to deal with deeper and broader 
concerns relating to WTO’s litigation wing. 
 
One of the proposals which could serve to disperse the US concerns could be to redesign the 
selection process of AB members. In doing so, the WTO membership (for the selection of 
AB members) can consider employing a listing procedure similar to the one used to select ad-
hoc panellists for the panel procedure.100 This proposal would require the AB Secretariat to 
maintain an indicative list of potential AB members that could be drawn for an appeal on a 
case-to-case basis in place of having a fixed tenured assignment. The WTO members can 
nominate candidates that meet the eligibility requirements of AB member (as stated in Art 
17.3 of DSU Agreement), and these nominations can be considered and approved by way of 
consensus at DSB meetings on a regular basis. The approved candidates can then be added to 
the indicative list of potential AB members maintained by the AB Secretariat. On an appeal 
being filed, AB Secretariat can propose nominations to the appellant and the appellee. If 
either appellant or appellee disagrees with these nominations, the decision could be taken by 
the WTO Director General (DG) in consultation with the four deputy DGs, DSB and parties 
to the dispute. 
 
This proposal can address the US concerns on one hand and the members’ interest in keeping 
AB alive. The list system would ensure continual existence of the appellate review procedure 
as no single member would be able to strangle the AB. It will be easier for DSB to accept 
nominations of candidates for the indicative list by way of positive consensus as compared to 
appointing or reappointing AB members for a fixed tenure of four years. It would also enable 
members to appoint those candidates that have proved their impartiality, precision and 
coherence in legal interpretation of WTO provisions. This would allow members to minimise 
or avoid the appointment of those members that are known for their judicially active 
approach of decision-making or their procedural disobedience (such as failure to provide a 
                                                           
99 ‘Transition on the WTO Appellate Body: A Pair of Reforms?’ Georgetown University IIEL Issue Brief 
2/2018, <https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/jwcvlz2thwtv3dhgdne0nkfk3vlpv3sf> accessed 29 August 2018 
100 The selection of panellists is described in DSU Agreement, Art 8.4  
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notice of resignation). This proposal could also potentially address the US concerns on 
‘quasi-automatic reappointment’ culture and Rule 15 as AB members will no longer have a 
fixed tenure and the disputing parties will be able to select an appellate judge based on its 
performance review. This system has worked well for the panel procedure, and hence it 
deserves a consideration for the appellate review procedure as well. This proposal has an 
inclusionary approach, and it can ignite fresh discussions with the US.   
 
Let us try to fix the problems that can be fixed. Let us not consider the alternatives of AB at 
this stage. Considering its alternatives indicates that we are already giving up on this 
institution. It will be very unfair to let the AB die in this manner.  
 
 
